Challenging Public Investigative Reports: How to Fight the Hearsay Exception by Grossman, Steven P. & Shapiro, Stephen J.
University of Baltimore Law
ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law
All Faculty Scholarship Faculty Scholarship
2-1991
Challenging Public Investigative Reports: How to
Fight the Hearsay Exception
Steven P. Grossman
University of Baltimore School of Law, sgrossman@ubalt.edu
Stephen J. Shapiro
University of Baltimore School of Law, sshapiro@ubalt.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Evidence
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more
information, please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Challenging Public Investigative Reports: How to Fight the Hearsay Exception, 27 Trial 61 (Feb. 91)
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1411760
Challenging Public 
Investigative Reports 
How to Fight the Hearsay Exception 
Steven P. Grossman and Stephen J. Shapiro 
ou represent a party 
in a personal-injury 
case involving a colli-
sion between two cars. 
The major factual issue 
in the case is which 
driver was at fault. The police officer 
who arrived at the scene after the acci-
dent interviewed both drivers and other 
eyewitnesses and filled out an accident 
report. The report concludes that your 
client was at fault. Your opponent moves 
for admission of the report as "a factual 
finding resulting from an investigation 
made pursuant to authority granted by 
law'~ under Federal Rule of Evidence 
803(8)(C) or its state-law equivalent. 
Do you know how to keep this harmful 
evidence from consideration by the juryr 
Maybe you represent the plaintiff in 
a civil-rights action against a police officer 
for excessive use of force. In this case, 
the police review board, headed by the 
precinct captain, held a hearing concern-
ing the incident. After the hearing, the 
captain issued a report finding that the 
officer had not used excessive force. 
Again, the report is offered under Rule 
803(8)(C). What can you do to keep 
this finding from the juryr 
These are not simply hypothetical sit-
uations. They are based on actual cases 
Steven P. Grossman and Stephen J Shapiro 
are professors at the University of Baltimore 
School of Law. 
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where federal judges have admitted re-
ports by government officials. 1 The 
admission of the reports was affirmed 
on appeal, even though in both cases 
the' authors of the reports had no first-
hand knowledge of the facts but relied 
on out-of-court statements made by oth-
ers. This lack would probably have pre-
vented both officials from stating their 
conclusions had they been called to the 
stand. But in both cases, the conclu-
sions were admitted as part of a public 
record or report under Rule 803(8)(C). 
Your natural response in these situa-
tions might be to claim that the evidence 
does not satisfY the rule because the rule 
allows for the admission of' 'factual find-
ings." You argue that the reports contain 
not factual findings but conclusions or 
opinions of the report writers. 
This argument would not succeed. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Beech Air-
craftv. Rainey Corp., interpreted the fac-
tual findings provision broadly to include 
conclusions and opinions of the govern-
ment investigator. 2 Beech Aircraft involved 
the crash of a Navy training jet. A judge 
advocate general (JAG) investigative re-
port concluded that the most likely cause 
of the accident was pilot error. The 
Court held that the conclusion should 
have been admitted at trial. 3 
In spite of the broad interpretation 
given the rule in Beech Aircraft, it is pos-
sible to challenge admission of factual 
findings in public reports. Rule 803(8)(C) 
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states that the findings will not be ad-
mitted if"the sources of information or 
other circumstances indicate lack of trust-
worthiness." Most courts have held that 
conclusions found in public reports will 
be presumed reliable and that the party 
opposing admission has the burden of 
proving the report is not trustworthy. 4 
This is no easy task. First, many courts 
have imposed a difficult standard of proof. 
Second, since the proponent of the re-
port need not produce the author, this 
showing will often have to be made with-
out cross-examination to challenge the 
author's credentials or methodology. 
Still, keeping a public report out of 
evidence is not impossible. The note of 
the advisory committee that drafted the 
rule lists four "trustworthiness" factors 
that can help you challenge admission. 
They are-
• the timeliness of the investigation, 
• the special skill or experience of the 
official, · 
• the issue of whether a hearing was 
held and the level at which it was con-
ducted, and 
• possible motivational problems sug-
gested by Palmer v. Hoffinan. 5 
Timeliness 
A prompt on-the-scene investigation 
is usually more valuable than one con-
ducted weeks or months later. The re-
sults of an earlier investigation are more 
helpful to the trier of fact because they 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1411760
are based on fresh evidence that may no 
longer be available. You can argue that 
an investigation conducted months after 
the incident usually is based on the same 
evidence available to the jury and that 
the investigator's conclusion may be no 
more reliable than the jury's. 
One problem in challenging a later re-
port is that it is often the product of a 
hearing. While the lack of timeliness 
may favor exclusion under the advisory 
committee's first factor, the fact that a 
hearing has been held may favor admis-
sion under the third factor. 
Skill and Experience 
The Supreme Court alluded to the 
skill and experience factor in Beech Air-
craft. The Court contrasted a similar 
JAG report of another Navy airplane 
accident that was denied admission in 
a separate case because it "was prepared 
by an inexperienced investigator in a 
highly complex field ofinvestigation."6 
You should try to investigate the qualifi-
cations of the author of any public re-
port just as thoroughly as you would 
those of opposing expert witnesses. You 
should be prepared to argue that the au-
thor did not have the requisite skill or 
experience to render the opinion or 
conclusion in the report. 
Unfortunately, you may not be granted 
access to depose the author of a public 
report as easily as you would to depose 
an opposing party's expert witness. You 
should point out to the judge that the 
author of a report functions much like 
an expert witness; the only difference is 
that the testimony is written rather than 
oral. If the report is important enough, 
consider issuing a deposition subpoena 
to the author. You can then ask about 
the author's qualifications and the pro-
cedures used to conduct the investiga-
tion. At least one court has enforced 
such a deposition subpoena. 7 
Your opponent will probably argue 
that one purpose ofRnle 803 is to allow 
admission of a public report to spare the 
investigator-a government employee-
the time needed to attend a trial or dep-
osition. 8 The answer to this argument 
is that the rule is a hearsay exception, 
which allows admission without pro-
ducing the declarant (author). It is not 
a rule of privilege that shields a witness 
who knows of relevant evidence from 
testifying. 
In comparing the author with an ex-
pert witness, argue that the conclusion 
in the report should not be admitted 
unless the author would have been al-
lowed to state it while testifying as an 
expert in court. If the conclusion goes 
beyond the author's area of expertise, 
it should not be admitted. 
For example, an investigator for a fed-
eral agency may be an expert in a certain 
field. If the report relies on the investi-
gator's expertise in that field, it should 
be admitted, just as expert testimony 
would be. However, if the conclusions 
are based on the testimony of conflicting 
witnc<;ses and simply determine that 
one witness is more credible than an-
other, they should not be admitted into 
evidence. Credibility determinations 
should be made by jurors, not by ex-
Some courts have accepted 
the argument that public 
reports based on hearsay, 
rather than personal 
knowledge, ntay never 
be admitted. 
perts or government investigators. 9 
Similarly, legal conclusions should not 
be allowed. The rule allov.rs for the ad-
mission of "factual findings." The Su-
preme Court in Beech Aircraft interpreted 
this to include conclusions and opinions. 
Although the Court did not explicitly 
say so, at least one post -Beech appellate 
court has held that these should be lim-
ited to factual-not legal-conclusions. 10 
Comparing the author of the report 
to an expert witness can help answer an-
other question: When can you challenge 
a government fact-finding because it was 
not based solely on the personal obser-
vations of the investigator but largely on 
the statement<> of third parties? 
Take, for example, the scenario of the 
police officer who did not witness an ac-
cident but based the conclusions in the 
report on the statements of eyewitnesses. 
Some courts have accepted the argument 
that public reports based on hearsay, 
rather than personal knowledge, may 
never be admitted.u 
This argument has some merit, since 
Rnle 803(8) is a hearsay exception and 
not a rule of admissibility. The purpose 
of most hearsay exceptions is to allow 
the declarant's out-of-court statement 
to take the place of in-court testimony. 
The evidence must, however, still be 
based on the declarant's personal knowl-
edge. The advisory committee's notes to 
Rule 803 state that "in a hearsay situa-
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tion, the declarant is, of course, a wit-
ness, and neither this rule nor Rule 804 
dispenses with the requirement of first-
hand knowledge.'' 
Rule 803(8) does not explicitly require 
the admission of hearsay-based conclu-
sions. Further, the rule exempts reports 
that are not trustworthy, and some courts 
seem to view hearsay within hearsay that 
is not covered by its own exception to 
be inherently untrustworthy. 
Rule 803(8)(C), however, dearly envi-
sions the admissibility of some findings 
not based on personal knowledge. Other-
wise, section C would be largely super-
fluous because section B already applies 
to any "matter observed pursuant to 
duty" and would apply in most situa-
tions where the investigator's findings 
are based on personal knowledge. 
Here is where the rules on expert wit-
nc%es can help your argument again. 
Rule 703 requires that the facts or data 
used by experts in forming their opin-
ions if not admissible in evidence must 
be "of a type reasonably relied upon by 
experts in the particular field." 
The advisory committee's note to Rule 
703 mentions that the opinion of an 
"accidentologist" about "the point of 
impact in an automobile collision based 
on statements of bystanders" would not 
meet this requirement and would not 
be admissible. You should argue that if 
an "accidentologist's" opinion would 
not be allowed in such a situation, nei-
ther should a police officer's opinion in 
a police report. 
You must persuade the judge that the 
public report is being substituted for the 
live testimony of the author. If the au-
thor would be barred from giving an 
opinion in court for whatever reason 
(such as insufficient expertise or reliance 
on materials not ordinarily used by ex-
perts in the field), then that opinion 
should not reach the jury through a 
public report. 
Significance of a Hearing 
Presumably, the implication of the 
hearing factor is that a report is more 
reliable and more likely to be admitted 
in court if the finding in the report 
emerged from a hearing. The absence 
of a hearing, however, does not always 
keep the report out. Courts have quite 
reasonably held that where a hearing 
would not normally have been a part of 
the investigation, the factor is irrelevant. 12 
For example, it will do little good to 
argue that a police accident report should 
be kept out because it was issued with-
67 
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out a hearing. The admissibility of a 
finding by the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission that discrimina-
tion has taken place may, however, turn 
on whether a hearing was held. 
Attacking Fairness 
Attacking the fairness of the hearing 
is one approach that may help keep out 
findings based on a hearing. If the pro-
ceeding was ex parte or the party against 
whom the finding is being used did not 
have the opportunity to cross-examine 
witnesses, you have a strong argument 
against the trustworthiness of the hear-
ing. Why should the jury-which hears 
both sides of the evidence, including 
cross-examination-need the hearing ex-
aminer's conclusion, which was based 
on a more limited inquiry? 
In fu.ct, some courts have accepted the 
novel argument that holding a hearing 
weighs against admission of the findings. 13 
This is because the result of a govern-
ment proceeding can be highly prejudi-
cial evidence. Jurors who learn that a 
presumably objective public official has 
reached a certain conclusion from evi-
dence similar to what they have heard 
may find it difficult to conclude differ-
endy. Further, the jury is likely to delib-
erate about the correctness of the previous 
fact-finding rather than keep an open 
mind on the facts of the case. 14 This 
argument is especially strong when there 
is conflicting evidence and the hearing 
exannner decides which is credible. This 
is the jury's role. 
Rule 403 
It may be helpful to use Rule 403 to 
challenge admission of a public report 
issued after a hearing. This rule requires 
the court to exclude relevant evidence 
"if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the <.ianger of unfu.ir prej-
udice, confusion of the issues, or mis-
leading the jury." You can argue that the 
jury may overestimate the probative value 
of official government reports. Courts 
have held that juries might believe that 
there is ''an aura of special reliability and 
trustworthiness" to the report because 
it is prepared by a government official. 15 
This danger is greatest when the report 
is issued after a hearing. 
You may also convince the court that 
government reports can be excluded 
under Rule 403 because of' 'considera-
tions of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence!' One court kept out a public re-
port because it would have protracted 
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"an already prolonged trial with an in-
quiry into collateral issues regarding the 
accuracy of the report and the methods 
used in its compilation."16 
However, any arguments against ad-
mission of the results of a hearing (under 
either Rule 803 or Rule 403) will prob-
ably come to naught if the statute under 
which the hearing was held explicitly 
directs or implies that the results should 
be admissible. For exan1ple, many states 
have statutes that require medical negli-
gence or malpractice cases to be tried 
befure a panel of experts bef<xe they can 
be brought to court. Some require that 
the results be admitted in any later suit. 
Even without a law requiring it, courts 
generally admit these findings to further 
the policy reasons behind the panels; 
that is, to encourage settlement of med-
ical negligence and malpractice cases. 17 
These are special situations, however, 
and the policy reasons do not apply to 
most government fact-findings. 
Motivational Problems 
. The issue of possible motivational prob-
lems behind a report's conclusions arose 
in Palmer v. Hoffman, a 1943 Supreme 
Court case. 18 It involved the admissibili-
ty of a report by the defendant railroad 
company that included a statement by 
the train engineer about the cause of a 
railroad accident. The Court held that 
the report was not admissible as a busi-
ness record because it was prepared for 
litigation. 19 There was too much moti-
vation for the railroad to be self-serving 
in preparing the report. 
How this translates to public reports 
is less than dear. Most are not prepared 
for litigation. When they are, however, 
and the suit is against the government 
body that prepared the report, you have 
a powerful argument to keep it out. For 
instance, in the previously cited suit 
against the police officer for use of exces-
sive force, you could argue that a police-
officer report clearing the officer is un-
trustworthy because of possible bias. 
However, courts are loath to assume 
bias by government officials and may 
require you to prove it. 20 This, of course, 
mav be difficult to do. 
S~me courts have limited their review 
of the motivation factor to possible bias 
by the author. They have ignored any 
possible bias held by the sources that the 
author consulted or interviewed. 21 The 
rationale is that public officials will con-
sider the possible bias of the source be-
fore using it in their fact-finding. 22 
If fu.ced with a report based on infor-
marion from hostile sources, you have 
support for challenging their motivation. 
First, Rule 803 clearly states that lack 
of trustworthiness can be shown by ''the 
sources of information or other circum-
stances." Second, in Palmer, the Supreme 
Court was concerned not only vvith the 
motivation of the railroad employee 
who prepared the report but also with 
that of the engineer who supplied the 
information and had something to gain 
by blaming the accident on someone 
else. 
The advisory committee noted that 
other trustworthiness factors ''no doubt 
could be added" to its list. A number 
of courts recognize the finality of the 
report as one additional fuctor. 23 If the 
report is the product of a staffinvestiga-
~or but was not approved by the employ-
~ng board or commission or incorporated 
rnto a final report, some courts may with-
hold it from the jury. 
Actually, any argument that calls into 
question the reliability or accuracy of 
the findings is fair game. A great deat of 
~scr~tion is granted to the trial judge 
m thts area. Understandably, trial court 
rulings dealing with similar kinds of re-
ports have been widely divergent. 24 
What should you do if a harmful re-
port is admitted against your client? 
There are ways to mitigate the damage. 
First, if the author's conclusions are 
admitted, you should question whether 
the entire report-including the sources 
on which the conclusions were based-
also must be admitted. If the report 
contains additional hearsay-the state-
ments of eyewitnesses-you have a strong 
argument for keeping them out. You 
should claim that they are "hearsay with-
in hearsay" and thus can only be ad-
mitted if each hearsay statement con-
forms with an exception to the hearsay 
rule. 25 They are not admissible merely 
because they are enshrined in a public 
report. Some courts have kept witness 
statements in a public report out of evi-
dence on this ground, especially when 
the report is not much more than a string 
of such statements. 26 
Other courts, however, have admitted 
hearsay statements. 27 Thev have reasoned 
that the statements are n~t really hearsay 
because they are not being admitted for 
their truth, but only to show the basis 
for the investigator's opinion. Before 
you accept this argument, be sure that-
• the report actually contains a con-
clusion and is not merely a series of hear-
say witness statements, 
• the author actually relied on the in-
If Your 
Competitors 
Aren't on TV, 
Don't Read 
This Ad. 
If you're the only legal advertiser in 
your market. you probably don't need the 
competitive edge our hard-hitting spots 
and aggressive media buying can give 
you. But ifyou're fighting to stand out 
from the crowd, call Mel Jones at MM&J. 
He'll show you how you can have your 
own package of customized commer-
cials that not only maintain your pro-
fessional image but bring in more calls 
in a shorter time than you ever thought 
possible. And how our sophisticated 
media planning and big-buyer clout can 
help you buy more and better TV time 
for your money. 
~MJ America's leading producer of 
r~tt!l§lijQiiilriijifiiiiH retail and professional commercials. 
800 624-9704 Madison, Muyskens & Jones, Inc .. Lakeville, CT 
TRIAL FEBRUARY 1991 69 
formation in reaching the conclusion, 
and 
• the type of information is normally 
relied on by experts in the field. 
If any of these conditions is not satis-
fied, the hearsay statements should not 
be admitted. Even if they are, you should 
be entitled to a limiting instruction in-
dicating that they are not to be consid-
ered for their truth.2s 
If you find that you cannot keep a 
public report out of evidence entirely, 
the next best step may be to ask that 
certain particularly prejudicial parts be 
withheld from the jury. You may also 
wish to ask for a cautionary instruction 
from the 
Several courts have approved instruc-
tions to the jury that the findings in 
goverument reports are to be treated like 
other evidence and are not binding. 29 
As with any limiting or cautionary in-
structions, however, you must balance 
the helpfulness of the instruction against 
the possibility that it may call undue at-
tention to the evidence. 
Another strategy question is whether 
you should call the author to the stand 
for cross-examination. The Federal Rules 
of Evidence say that "if the party against 
whom a hearsay statement has been ad-
mitred calls the declarant as a witness, 
the party is entitled to examine him on 
the statement as if under cross-exarnina-
tion."30 This may be an excellent way 
to expose weaknesses in the author's ex-
pertise, methodology, or use of sources 
that may have led to a faulty conclusion. 
For example, the author could be ques-
Several courts have approved 
instructions to the jury that 
the findings in government 
reports are to be treated 
like other evidence 
and are not binding. 
tioned about tests not performed and 
sources not consulted. 
You must balance this benefit against 
the risk that calling the author will in-
crea<Je the report's importance in jurors' 
eyes. You may choose instead to call 
your own expert witness to challenge 
the report's methodology and conclusion. 
Investigative and evaluative reporrs by 
government officials can be convenient 
and powerful tools for presenting a case 
NEW ON VIDEO! 
to the jury. For example, studies per-
formed by skilled investigators in a pro-
fessional manner by government agencies 
investigating the safety of products 
should generally be admissible into 
evidence. 31 Such studies, which could 
be necessary to prove critical elements 
of a case, may not easily be performed 
by a private party. 
Most attorneys know of the hearsay 
exception for government reports and 
know how to use it. What they need 
to know is how to frame an argument 
opposing admission of these reports. 
Knowing how to do this should help 
them avoid the harm that unreliable and 
prejudicial reports can cause. D 
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isticallink between tampons and toxic shock 
syndrome). 
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...---- DON'T GAMBLE WITH SECURITY! ---, 
Be smart. Let Integrity Life and General American 
Life JOINTLY back your structured benefits. Why 
settle for one? Now, you can double your clients' 
protection. 
Feel secure in knowing your clients have two separate, 
UNAFFILIATED companies standing behind the settle-
ment benefits, instead of just one . 
.______;__ _ LET US SHOW YOU HOW. ___ ____, 
INTEGRITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
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